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Abstract
Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers usually …nd that bequests
are equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be com-
pensatory. Using the 1992 and 1994 waves of the Health and Retirement
Study, we …nd that only 4% of parents who give, divide their gifts equally
among their children. Estimating probit models, using family panels, we
…nd that gifts are compensatory in the sense that a child is more likely to
receive a gift if she works fewer hours and has lower income than than her
brothers and sisters. These results carry over to the amounts given. Fixed
e¤ects Tobit estimations show that the fewer hours a child works and the
lower her income is, the more the parents give. Gifts are compensatory.
The empirical results are, therefore, consistent with the predictions of the
altruistic model of intergenerational transfers.
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Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers show that post mortem bequests
are equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory.1
The di¤erence between bequest and gift behavior is a puzzle since established
models of intergenerational transfers predict that there should be no di¤erence.2
Altruistic parents will make compensatory transfers, regardless of whether the
transfer is inter vivos or post mortem.3
The determinants of intergenerational transfers are important in many …elds
in economics. In macroeconomics, for example, the Ricardian equivalence pre-
dictions rest on the assumption of dynastic, or altruistic, behavior. Intergenera-
tional transfers are also important when discussing the distribution of income and
wealth. The extent to which wealth is carried over from one generation to the
next a¤ects how equal opportunities really are.
A third …eld for which intergenerational transfers are important is savings.
Strong bequest motives will a¤ect savings behavior, as regards to both amounts
and timing over the life cycle. Finally, there are also public …nance aspects of
intergenerational transfers. Depending on the determinants of transfer behavior,
taxes on gifts and bequests may or may not create excess burdens.
The literature on intergenerational transfers is characterized by competing
assumptions concerning the properties of the utility function. This is rare in
economics. In most cases the utility function is taken as given. Within area …eld
of intergenerational transfers, however, data are asked to guide us.
The objective of this paper is to …nd out empirically what explains the observed
pattern of giving. An important question is if gifts are compensatory, i.e., if
parents give more to a child with less resources of her own than her brothers and
sisters.
There are several recent papers studying inter vivos gifts. Dunn and Phillips
(1997) …nd, using U.S. data, that gifts are compensatory in the sense that higher
income of a child makes a gift less likely. They use data from the Asset and Health
1Most empirical studies of estate division …nd equal division; see Menchik (1980, 1988) and
Wilhelm (1996) for the U.S. and Arrondel et al. (1997) for France. Tomes (1981, 1988), however,
…nds that bequests are compensatory.
2See also the surveys by Laitner (1997) and Masson and Pestieau (1997).
3Cremer and Pestieau (1996), in a model of altruistic parents facing moral hazard and the
samaritan’s dilemma, generate the prediction that gifts are equal and bequests are compensatory.
Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000) assume that gifts are private information while bequests are public
information and that parents care about their reputation after death. Given these assumptions
altruistic parents will choose compensatory gifts and equal bequests. Bernheim and Severinov
(2000) and Balestrino (2000) also discuss theoretical models that generate results consistent
with the empirical evidence.
1Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD).4
In this paper we study data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).5
The HRS has been designed and conducted by the University of Michigan’s Survey
Research Center. It is a panel data set, focusing on health and retirement related
issues of the U.S. pre-retirement population (cohorts born between 1931 and 1941).
It was launched in 1992 and is repeated biennually. We primarily focus on the
1992 wave. However, to get a better measure of the long-term giving behavior of
the parents, we also use the amounts transferred to children from the 1994 wave
and sum them with the amounts from the 1992 wave.6
The HRS is an excellent data set to study questions addressed in our paper.
The coverage of the pre-retirement cohort includes those who have accumulated
substantial wealth from life cycle savings. They are, therefore, in a position
where they can a¤ord to give away money. Moreover, as they are about to retire
within the foreseeable future, they make conscious decisions about how to use
the accumulated resources. Possibly even more importantly, the HRS contains
information on two generations of the same family, parents and children.
We want to emphasize two features of our analysis. First, we—in contrast to
most other studies—focus on data on the recipient level (children) rather than
data on the donor level (parents). This makes it possible to control for …xed
family e¤ects. This is essential. The predictions of the inter vivos gifts models
are predictions of the within family variation in gift behavior, not the between
family variation.
Second, the child level data permit us to exploit recently developed economet-
ric methodology for panel data. In particular, we can estimate the amounts of
gifts received by the children in a family as a function of sibling’s characteristics
such as income and demographics, taking into account the high frequency of zero
observations by means of a family …xed e¤ects Tobit model for unbalanced panel
data.
Conditional on giving at all, we …nd that only 4% of parents in the HRS divide
their gifts equally among their children. Equal sharing is decreasing in the number
4Some other empirical papers on gifts are Altonji et al. (1992), Altonji et al. (1997), Arrondel
and Laferrère (1998), Arrondel and Wol¤ (1998), Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992), Cox et al.
(1997), Guiso and Jappelli (1991), Poterba (1997), and Poterba (1998).
5McGarry and Schoeni (1995) use data from the HRS while McGarry (1998, 1999) combine
the HRS and the AHEAD.
6More information on the structure of HRS is available in Juster and Suzman (1995),
data quality issues are discussed in Juster and Smith (1997). The HRS web site at
<http://www.umich.edu/»hrswww> is the main source of information. We use the public
release data …les that are available for the 1992 wave (fully cleaned and imputed) and the 1994
wave (partly cleaned and imputed). The sample is not representative. African Americans,
Hispanics and Florida residents are oversampled.
2of children: 9% of the parents with two children share equally while less than 1%
of the parents with 5 children or more give the same amounts. Allowing some
variation from the intrafamily mean, up to 7% of the parents give amounts to
each child.
Our main result is that the empirical …ndings suggest that gifts are compen-
satory. This is consistent with the predictions of the altruistic model of intergen-
erational transfers.
Estimating probit models, using family panels, we …nd that gifts are compen-
satory in the sense that a child is more likely to receive a gift if she works fewer
hours and has lower income than than her brothers and sisters.
These results carry over to the amounts given. Estimations of …xed and ran-
dom e¤ects models, conditional on positive family gift amounts, and …xed and
random e¤ect Tobit estimations show that the fewer hours a child works and the
lower her income is, the more the parents give.
The paper is structured as follows: The testable predictions from competing
theoretical models of intergenerational transfers are discussed in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 describes the HRS sample. We give some general information and summary
statistics for key variables. The estimates for a probit model (family level), a ran-
dom e¤ects probit model, …xed and random e¤ects conditional amount models,
and …xed and random e¤ects Tobit model are reported in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2. Theoretical framework
Gifts are voluntary intergenerational transfers. Di¤erent theoretical models of
voluntary intergenerational transfers have been proposed in the literature.7 We
will discuss the altruistic model, the egoistic model, and the exchange model.
Throughout our review of the theoretical models we will assume that the
behavior of those receiving transfers (children) is not a¤ected by the decisions of
those making transfers (parents). Hence, we rule out any strategic interactions
between donors and donees (cf. Cremer and Pestieau, 1996). There will, for
example, be no samaritan’s dilemma in the models discussed.
Transfers within families are also discussed in the literature on risk sharing
within families. In situations when insurance markets are missing intrafamily
7Bequests, on the other hand, may arise accidentally because of imperfect markets for an-
nuities. The accidental model of Davies (1981) is a version of the life-cycle model. Households
cannot insure because of adverse selection in annuities markets. Instead they have to save for a
long retirement. If they die young, their unused resources become accidental bequests. If they
live a long time, they may die with little or no estate. Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) report
rather ambivalent support for the model.
3transfers may be the result of informal insurance arrangements within the family.
Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993), and Kocherlakota (1996) are some
of the papers in this tradition.8
2.1. The altruistic model
This is the Becker (1974) and Barro (1974) framework.9 Consider a parent who
has two children. The parent’s total income is Y p, the children’s incomes are Y c
1
and Y c
2 . In the altruistic model, the parent cares about her own consumption, Cp,
and the children’s total resources, Y c
1 + G1 and Y c
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2 + G2)); (1)
subject to
C
p + G1 + G2 = Y
p; (2)
G1 ¸ 0;G 2 ¸ 0 (3)
with U(:) and V (:) concave and increasing and with U0(0) = 1 = V 0(0). The price
of consumption is 1. V (:) measures parental utility from a child’s consumption
and ¯ registers the strength of the parent’s altruistic sentiments. Despite the
simplicity of (1)–(3), the behavioral implications seem quite general.
Let Bi = B(Y p;Yc
1 ;Yc
2 ;¯);i=1 ;2 be the gifts that maximize utility in absence
of the constraint Gi ¸ 0;i=1 ;2,s ot h a t :






Solving the …rst-order conditions of utility maximization, assuming interior solu-
tions, yields:10





The parent will equalize the consumption opportunities of the children. We can
also compute the partial derivatives of the behavioral equations. Higher income for
8Di Tella and MacCullogh (1999) discuss intrafamily transfers interact with a public unem-
ployment insurance system.
9The presentation is inspired by Laitner and Juster (1996).
10Drazen (1978) discusses the situation when the parent wants to make negative transfers but
are forced to the corner solution.
4a child reduces the gift it receives. The total resources of the child will, however,










Higher income for the parent leads to more gifts. Similarly, higher income for a
sibling also increases the gift. It turns out that these two partial derivatives are
identical. What matters are the total resources of the other people in the family,














A child will only get more resources if family income increases. This is related
to the Rotten Kid theorem, see Becker (1974) and Bergstrom (1989). The theorem
says that if all family members receive gifts from an altruistic parent, it will be
in the interest even of sel…sh family members to maximize total family income.
The partial derivatives can be combined to yield an adding–up condition. If
the parent gains a dollar while a child loses the same amount, a one dollar gift







2.2. The egoistic model
In another frequently used model (e.g. Blinder, 1974; Andreoni, 1989; Hurd, 1989),
a parent derives utility from the amount it gives (joy of giving) but not from the
utility the child actually derives from the resulting transfer. This is sometimes





¤(G1 + G2); (6)
subject to (2) and (3). The partial derivatives of the behavioral functions become:
0 <
@(G1 + G2)
@Y p < 1
11Altonji et al. (1997) test this condition.
5Compared to the altruistic model, there are no di¤erences of the e¤ects of
the parent’s income. The models di¤er in the implications of children’s incomes.
Behavior according to the egoistic model is not a¤ected by the incomes of the
children.
2.3. The exchange model
Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987) present versions of the exchange model.
In this model, the parent does not care about the consumption possibilities of the
children. Instead she values the attention of the children more than services oth-
erwise purchased in anonymous markets. Suppose a parent obtains such attention
in proportion to the amounts she gives to her children—Gi = piCs
i;i=1 ;2.S i n c e
the opportunity cost of each child’s time is increasing in its income Y c
i ;i=1 ;2,
the implicit price the parent pays for attention, pi, will tend to be increasing in
Y c





























2 ¸ 0: (9)
Higher income of the parent will tend to result in more gifts but also more own
consumption. The parent’s consumption will respond to changes in income of






The impact of the children’s incomes on gifts and the parent’s own consump-
tion is, however, ambiguous. The signs of the partial derivatives will depend on
the price elasticity of the demand for child services. If it is low enough for ex-
penditure to increase when the price increases, e.g., because there are no close
substitutes to the services of a particular child, we …nd the following:12
12The condition for a low enough demand elasticity is Cs
1 > ¡V 0
1=V 00
1 ; where V 0
1 is the marginal
utility of consuming Cs
1 while V 00
1 is the second derivative of V1(Cs
1). If this condition does not
hold the signs are reversed.
6Table 2.1: Theoretically predicted e¤ects on parental gifts to a child.
model parent’s resources child’s own income sibling’s income
the altruistic model + ¡ +
the egoistic model + 00
t h ee x c h a n g em o d e l ++ a ¡a















The partial derivatives with respect to Y c
2 are analogous.
2.4. Summing up
Table 2.1 summarizes the predictions of the di¤erent gift models. All models
share the prediction that more resources for the parent will increase the gifts. The
empirical analysis of this variable cannot help us to distinguish between di¤erent
theories. It is, however, a consistency requirement to empirically verify that more
resources for parents result in higher gifts.
The di¤erent assumptions concerning the utility function show up in the pre-
dictions of how the children’s incomes a¤ect gift behavior. The within family
variation in income has di¤erent e¤ects according to the three theories. Here the
empirical analysis can shed light on the question which model is consistent with
the data.
3. Descriptive facts
3.1. The 1992 HRS wave
The 1992 wave of the HRS comprises information on about 7,000 households
with some 25,000 children. The sampled population is U.S. residents of the pre-
7retirement cohort born during 1931-1941 (either family head or spouse), excluding
institutionalized persons households. The core sample aims to be representative,
although there is deliberate oversampling of Blacks, Hispanics, and Florida resi-
dents (186:100, 172:100, 200:100, respectively).
There are almost 13,000 respondents. Within a household there are two main
respondent types: the primary respondent, who is considered most knowledgeable
of household …nancial matters, and the family respondent who is usually the
female member in a couple.
Apart from family structure and transfers, the questionnaire covers the demo-
graphic background, health status, housing, employment, last job and job history,
retirement plans, assets and liabilities, income, information on children, and a
number of additional, experimental modules.
We use information from the parts on demographics, assets, income, health,
family relations and transfers, and on children. Information on the latter two
parts was provided by the family respondent. It contains data on the number,
sex, age, education etc. of all children of the family, and on inter vivos transfers
from parents to their children during the preceding year.
For the present study, the information on inter vivos transfers is of crucial
importance. The questionnaire asks the following question:
(Not counting any shared housing or shared food,) Have you [and your
(husband/partner)] given (your child/any of your children) …nancial
assistance totaling $500 or more in the past 12 months?
[DEFINITION: By …nancial assistance we mean giving money, helping
pay bills, or covering speci…c types of costs such as those for medical
care or insurance, schooling, down payment for a home, rent, etc. The
…nancial assistance can be considered support, a gift or a loan.]
We interpret this as gifts. If the answer is a¢rmative, the respondent is then
asked to give the total amounts transferred, per child.
The sample we select for the present study includes only families with children.
We lose some, but not many, observations due to some inconsistencies in the data,
and due to missing values in selected variables.
Information on net worth is available for all households, although it is not quite
clear which observations have been imputed and to which extent imputation error
might be an issue. The number of missing observations of children’s annual income
is due to the fact that this information has only been requested for children not
living at home. For children living at home, only labor income has been probed.
83.2. The 1994 HRS wave
The Health and Retirement sta¤ provides the 1992 wave with full imputations
of all variables. The degree of imputation for the 1994 wave is much lower. In
particular, missing values for the amounts transferred have not been imputed. We
imputed values for the missing amounts ourselves, conditional on parents reporting
that amounts were given, and conditional on bracket information available in the
second wave.
Note that the wording of the questions was slightly di¤erent in the 1994 wave
compared to the 1992. Whereas in the 1992 wave, all amounts exceeding USD
500 were requested, in the 1994 wave, amounts exceeding USD 100 were asked.
In order to achieve full comparability we disregard (set to zero) all those amounts
that fell below USD 500 in either wave (even in wave one some amounts below
the threshold were reported). Also note that we converted all amounts to 1991
dollars (which is the reference year of the 1992 wave of HRS), using the CPI.
Prices increased by about 7.8% between the waves.
We used the information in the 1994 wave to update the 1992 wave information.
In particular those values for children’s non time varying characteristics and age
that had been imputed in the 1992 wave but had valid values in the 1994, were
updated to reduce the impact of imputation error on the estimates.
3.3. Descriptive statistics across waves
The data contains 7,000 families with 24,700 children in the 1992 wave, and 6,200
families with 22,900 children in the 1994 wave. After applying some exclusion
restrictions, we retain 5,400 families with 18,900 children: We drop all observations
where a change in family structure has taken place. To be precise, we drop those
households that participated only once in the survey, where the family respondent
changed between waves, where a household was split in subhouseholds between the
waves, where a main respondent had died between the waves, or where the number
or identity of children changed (for instance, because children not mentioned in the
…rst wave were added in the second, or because children had died between waves).
This way, we retain only complete and intact households that are comparable
in family structure over time. The reason for these exclusions is that it is not
clear how to deal with these observations in our model. In addition, the proper
econometric handling would be substantially more involved.
Table 3.1 shows that 38% of the families gave in 1992 while 16% of the children
received gifts. The corresponding numbers for 1994 are almost the same. The
amounts given and received are, however, slightly lower in 1994 compared to
1992.
We next look at the joint incidence of gifts on family level and child level, see
9Table 3.1: Summary statistics across waves.
mean std dev median
HRS 1992 HRS 1994 HRS 1992 HRS 1994 HRS 1992 HRS 1994
incidence:
family level 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.48 0 0
child level 0.16 0.15 0.37 0.36 0 0
amount:
family level,
unconditional 2,029 1,703 7,740 5,251 0 0
conditional 5,412 4,611 11,897 7,826 2,500 1,855
child level,
unconditional 580 487 3,165 2,365 0 0
conditional 3,627 3,236 7,179 5,322 1,500 1,391
Note. We use the sampling weights. Amounts are in 1991 dollars.
Conditional refers to the statistics obtained conditional on only using
observations with positive gift amounts.
Table 3.2: Joint incidence of gifts, percent.
1994 wave
family level child level
010 1
1992 wave 0 48.5 14.0 76.2 7.8
1 14.6 22.9 8.8 7.2
number of 5,394 18,883
observations
Table 3.2. There were no gifts to any child in about half of the families. One
out of four families gave in both years. However, three quarters of the children in
the sample did not receive any gifts at all, and only 7 percent received gifts both
years.
The correlation of gift incidence across waves is 0.38 on the family level. The
corresponding correlation on the child level is 0.37. If we instead compare the
amounts in the two waves the correlations are lower. On the family level the
correlation is 0.29, on the child level it is 0.26.
3.4. Descriptive statistics, combined sample
Table 3.3 cross-tabulates the number of children in the family against the fraction
of parents who have given …nancial assistance. Slightly more than half of par-
10Table 3.3: Fraction of households giving and giving equally.
number number of families:
of total giving: equal § 2% § 5% § 10% § 20%
children % giving from the intrafamily mean
1 515 255 49.5 - - - - -
2 1,434 777 54.2 68 72 81 102 148
3 1,260 699 55.5 12 16 16 19 26
4 909 485 53.4 7 7 7 7 9
>4 1,276 563 44.1 1 2 2 2 3
total 5,394 2,779 51.5 88 97 106 130 186
share of those 100.0 3.5 3.8 4.2 5.2 7.4
giving, %a
a. We use sampling weights.
ents have made gifts. For families with more than two children, this fraction is
decreasing in the number of children. Conditional on giving anything at all, the
table also shows that 4% of the parents with more than one child give the same
amount to all children. Equal sharing is decreasing in the number of children, 9%
of the parents with two children give equally while less than 1% of the parents
with 4 children or more give the same amounts. Allowing some intrafamily vari-
ation, 7% of the parents give amounts to each child in the interval § 20% from
the intrafamily mean.
Table 3.4 shows dollar amounts given by parents. In other words, these are
the per family gifts given, not the per child gifts received. Clearly, the amounts
given are decreasing in the number of children. The table also shows that parents
who use equal sharing give more than other parents.
To put things in perspective, the last row in the table reports the accumulated
spending on the children’s schooling by parents.13 The amounts are considerable.
The di¤erences in schooling expenditure between parents who give equally and
other parents are not as accentuated as the di¤erences in amounts given.
Table 3.5 suggests that not only are richer parents more likely to give at all,
but also that higher net worth increases the likelihood of equal giving. Similarly,
the total amount spent on children’s education increases if one restricts the sample
to those who give at all, give to all, and share equally (not reported in the table).
In Table 3.6 we switch to child level data. The idea is to get a …rst indication if
gifts are compensatory or not. We do not know the exact income of the children,
only the income range of each child as reported by the parent. As is clear from the
13This is available only on the family level, not per individual child.
11Table 3.4: Amounts given.
number of number of
number families amount: families amount:
of giving family mean standard giving family mean standard
children USD deviation equally USD deviation
1 225 6,203 10,847
2 777 4,705 8,725 68 9,686 20,637
3 699 2,584 4,831 12 7,458 20,985
4 485 1,885 3,472 7 2,686 3,381
>4 563 1,019 1,483 1 600
total gifts 2,779 3,101 6,614 88 8,665 19,731
total acc. 2,489 20,441 22,379 69 22,385 24,597
spending on
schooling
Note. We use the sampling weights.
Table 3.5: Parents’ net worth.
number of family net worth:
families mean standard
USD 1,000 deviation
total 5,394 238.9 493.4
giving 2,779 293.9 569.9
equal giving 88 522.0 1,051.7
Note. We use the sampling weights.
12Table 3.6: Gifts and children’s incomes.
number of gift amounts:
children mean standard
USD deviation
children not living with their parents:
annual income < USD 10,000 2,948 1,084 4,038
annual income USD 10,000 – 25,000 5,410 790 3,675
annual income > USD 25,000 6,602 801 3,716
annual income missing 160 1588 2,997
children living with their parents 3,763 2,694 7,286
total 18,883 1,219 4,728
Notes. We use the sampling weights. For children living with their parents
there is only information on labor income, not total annual income.
table, children with annual incomes above USD 10,000 get less than children with
incomes below. This suggests that gifts are compensatory. There seems, however,
not to exist so big di¤erences between the children with annual incomes of USD
10,000 – 25,000 and those with more than USD 25,000 in annual income. Children
still living with their parents received considerably more than other children.
4. Empirical evidence
This section reports our estimation results. The presentation is organized around
six tables. We use the same baseline speci…cation (in terms of regressors) across all
models. We have done extensive speci…cation search. For instance, in preliminary
regressions we included the gender of the child as explanatory variable without
…nding signi…cant di¤erences between the sexes. We have also, without success,
used an array of possible interactions between explanatory variables. To preserve
a parsimonious speci…cation, we do not consider these anymore.
We use splines for the age and years of education variables. The years of
education variable is, however, topcoded. We include a dummy variable for 17
years or more of education. The number of children is captured by a set of dummy
variables for one child, two children, ..., up to ten or more children with one child
used as reference because the impact may be nonlinear.
Measurement error is likely to a¤ect our estimates. The variables are based on
13recall information from the parents. Parents are unlikely to know exactly what
their children earn, especially when they don’t live at home. This could lead to
a downward bias in the estimates (i.e. towards zero). Hence our result would be
expected to be even stronger had there not been any measurement errors.
Table 4.1 presents the results from a family level probit model. The dependent
variable is a binary indicator equal to one if parents give anything to any of their
children. The explanatory variables for the children are averages for all children in
the family while the variables for the parents are represented by the characteristics
of the family respondent. The exceptions are net wealth and income which refer
to both spouses. We report marginal e¤ects of the regressors on the estimated
probabilities.
There are several important results in the table. Parents with higher net worth
and higher income are more likely to give. The probability of giving increases with
age and the years of education of the parent. African American parents are less
likely to give. The better health of the parent, the more likely are gifts. This may
indicate that healthy people have more possibilities to give. A Wald test rejects
the joint signi…cance of the set of dummy variables for the number of children,
p–value =0 :202.
More children being married, on average, decreases the probability of giving.
The probability decreases with the average age of the children. But many of the
child characteristic variables are not signi…cant. More homeowners among the
siblings decreases the probability of gifts while more school children, on average,
increases it.
Most importantly, the working hours and income variables, that measure the
children’s resources on average, point in di¤erent directions. If the children work
more, on average, the gift probability decreases (the p–value of a Wald test of
the joint signi…cance of the two variables is =0 :037)w h e r e a sh i g h e ri n c o m e ,o n
average, has a positive but insigni…cant impact on the gift probability (p–value
=0 :533). Below we will return to the question if this is a result of using family
averages. Contrasting these results with estimations using child level data shows
that using family level data hides important patterns in the data.
In Table 4.2 we use child level data based on 15,000 children in 4,900 families.
We can now control for family speci…c e¤ects. In general, these can be modeled
as …xed e¤ects. This has, however, drawbacks in our particular case. Only obser-
vations from families where some children receive gifts while others do not, can be
used. A …xed (family) e¤ects logit model, for example, can only use observations
where there are within family di¤erences in the dependent variable. Hence, all
observations of equal sharing would have to be dropped.
We rely instead on a random (family) e¤ects probit model. In terms of estima-
tion, we have decided to use a simulation estimator when estimating the nonlinear
14Table 4.1: Gift probability, marginal e¤ects, probit, family level.
Child characteristics, family averages Parent characteristics, family respondent
works < 30 hours per week -0.030 (0.59) log net worth 0.013 (6.91)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.083 (2.48) log income 0.062 (8.99)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 0.000 (0.01) age (age < 55) 0.009 (2.91)
income > USD 25,000 0.026 (0.76) age (age ¸ 55) 0.004 (0.96)
married -0.084 (2.84) years of education ( < 12) 0.017 (2.72)
grandchildren -0.018 (0.60) years of education (12 – 16) 0.032 (4.78)
age (age < 30) -0.016 (4.46) years of education ( > 16), dummy 0.031 (0.78)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.014 (3.20) number of children 9 dummies
age (age ¸ 40) -0.067 (2.06) male -0.018 (0.55)
years of education ( < 12) 0.018 (0.79) African American -0.101 (4.36)
years of education (12 – 16) 0.002 (0.23) Hispanic -0.055 (1.60)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.142 (2.60) other non–Caucasian 0.015 (0.25)
natural child 0.021 (0.91) health, fair 0.078 (2.11)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.032 (1.53) health, good 0.095 (2.77)
homeowner -0.106 (4.07) health, very good 0.102 (2.91)
school child 0.311 (7.26) health, excellent 0.113 (3.10)
number of families 4,908
Â2(27) 939.3
pseudo R2, McFadden 0.138
pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.294
log likelihood -2,932.3
Notes. Absolute z–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
“income < USD 10,000”, and “health, poor”. For summary statistics, see Appendix A.
15Table 4.2: Gift probability, marginal e¤ects, random e¤ects probit, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, family respondent
works < 30 hours per week -0.002 (0.19) log net worth 0.007 (9.00)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.027 (3.37) log income 0.038 (17.5)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.014 (1.86) age (age < 55) 0.001 (0.59)
income > USD 25,000 -0.063 (7.32) age (age ¸ 55) 0.005 (2.90)
married -0.025 (3.88) years of education ( < 12) 0.009 (3.21)
grandchildren 0.031 (5.36) years of education (12 – 16) 0.015 (5.66)
age (age < 30) -0.010 (8.69) years of education ( > 16), dummy 0.030 (2.03)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.006 (4.74) number of children 9 dummies
age (age ¸ 40) -0.014 (2.29) male -0.014 (1.21)
years of education ( < 12) 0.011 (1.69) African American -0.040 (5.41)
years of education (12 – 16) -0.000 (0.15) Hispanic -0.014 (1.08)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.011 (0.97) other non–Caucasian 0.006 (0.23)
natural child 0.039 (5.31) health, fair 0.044 (2.16)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.031 (5.17) health, good 0.041 (2.31)
homeowner -0.035 (5.85) health, very good 0.051 (2.76)
school child 0.065 (4.65) health, excellent 0.057 (2.80)
number of children 14,927 number of families 4,905
pseudo R2, McFadden 0.131
pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.333
log likelihood -5,876.8
Notes. Absolute z–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not
work at all”, “income < USD 10,000”, and “health, poor”.
16random e¤ects models. Here we draw random e¤ects from their estimated distri-
bution instead of integrating them out. This is in some sense less arbitrary and
gives more reliable estimates than the standard way of integrating out the e¤ects.
The standard way depends heavily on the approximation chosen to evaluate the
function, i.e., the number of quadrature points. We have done sensitivity checks
to ensure that the estimates we obtain are reliable. The number of draws is set
to 100 per observation for all estimates.
Comparing with Table 4.1 it is clear that going from family level data to child
level data produces much richer results. Almost all estimated marginal e¤ects are
signi…cant at the conventional 5%–level.
Here we …nd, in contrast to the family level estimations reported in Table 4.1,
that the probability of giving decreases if the child has higher income. The Wald
test of joint signi…cance yields a p–value of 0:000. This clearly shows the potential
pitfalls of using family level data and the advantages in using child level data to
detect the patterns in the data. The table also shows that more working hours
for the child decreases the probability of the parents giving, p–value =0 :001.
The gift probability decreases with the child’s age. Children living close to
their parents, and children still in school are also more likely to receive a gift.
Moreover, a natural child is more likely to receive than, for example, a step child
or an adopted child.14
The probability decreases if the child is married, and if she owns a home.
Parents are, on the other hand, more likely to give to a child if the child has
c h i l d r e no fh e ro w n .
Looking at the parents’ characteristics, we …nd that higher net worth and
higher income increases the gift probability. If parents have many children they are
less likely to give. The point estimates of the dummy variables are all signi…cant
and increasingly negative. The p–value of the Wald test for joint signi…cance is
0:000. Note that the set of dummy variables for the number of children was not
signi…cant in the family level probit.
On the other hand, the gift probability increases with age, the years of educa-
tion, and the health of the parents.
The remaining four tables focus on the amounts received by children as de-
pendent variable. The predictions of the theoretical models reviewed in section
2 have more to do with gift amounts than gift probabilities. The results in the
tables that follow are, therefore, closer to test of the predictions of the theoretical
models than the estimated models for gift probabilities.
In Table 4.3 we report estimates of a model with …xed family e¤ects. The
dependent variable, in this and the remaining tables, is log (amount in USD +
1). Only children from families where the parents have made gifts to at least one
14We have de…ned a natural child as being natural to both partners in the surveyed household.
17of the children, but not necessarily to each child, are included.
This leaves us with 2,400 families and 6,900 children. When the family e¤ects
are modeled as …xed, only the child characteristics can be included among the
explanatory variables. The estimation results are similar to those reported for the
gift probabilities. Working more and having higher income reduce the gift amount
received. The p–values of joint tests are 0:001 and 0:000.T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
gifts being compensatory.
Being a natural child, living close to the parents, being at school, and having
children of ones own all increase the amounts that parents give, while being older,
married and a home owner decreases the amounts. It is also interesting to note
that the years of education variables are not signi…cant in this estimation, in
contrast to the previous.
In Table 4.4 we repeat the analysis including random family e¤ects instead of
…xed.15 The estimated e¤ects of child characteristics are similar to those of the
…xed family e¤ects model. The p–values of joint tests for the child’s working time
and income are 0:001 and 0:000.
In the random e¤ects case, we can also include parent characteristics. Higher
net worth and higher income increases the amount that the parents give to a child.
The amount is also increasing in the age and the years of education of the parent.
More children, on the other hand, reduces the amount given to each child. The
p–value of the Wald test for joint signi…cance of the set of dummy variables is
0:000. Figure 4.1 shows the estimated coe¢cients (solid line) and the con…dence
intervals (dashed lines). African American parents give less. The health of parents
does not a¤ect the amounts.
The parameter estimates in the previous two models tell us the impact of
characteristics on amounts given in families where parents have decided to make
a gift. The estimates are, however, potentially biased estimates when addressing
our question to any parent with children. Viewing the decision to give nothing at
all or a positive amount as being governed by the same process, we can estimate
family e¤ects Tobit models. Now we can also include children from families where
there are no gifts. We use the approach of Honoré (1992) when estimating the
…xed e¤ects Tobit for the gift amounts. The sample increases to almost 4,000
families and 13,500 children.
Honoré’s estimator was developed for “ordinary” panel data with two “time
periods” (in our case two children) per family. We use the estimator for censored
observations that is based on a smooth conditional moment condition. Since our
sample includes families with more than two children (unbalanced panel data set),
we can estimate the model for all perceivable pairwise combinations of children
15A Hausman test of the …xed e¤ect speci…cation against the random e¤ects rejects the random
e¤ects speci…cation with a p–value of 0:000.
18Table 4.3: Gift amounts, …xed e¤ects model, conditional on positive family
amounts, child level.
Child characteristics
works < 30 hours per week 0.155 (0.70)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.438 (2.98)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.489 (2.82)
income > USD 25,000 -1.516 (7.88)
married -0.426 (3.30)
grandchildren 0.687 (5.36)
age (age < 30) -0.154 (6.73)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.117 (5.07)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.112 (1.33)
years of education ( < 12) 0.104 (0.79)
years of education (12 – 16) -0.005 (0.11)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.155 (0.70)
natural child 1.466 (4.29)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.645 (5.44)
homeowner -0.558 (4.45)
school child 0.758 (3.96)
constant 6.634 (4.30)
number of children 6,926




pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.333
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are
“does not work at all”, and “income < USD 10,000”.
19Table 4.4: Gift amounts, random e¤ects model, conditional on positive family
amounts, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, family respondent
works < 30 hours per week 0.138 (0.76) log net worth 0.061 (4.88)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.306 (2.56) log income 0.235 (5.91)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.292 (2.15) age (age < 55) 0.012 (0.82)
income > USD 25,000 -1.088 (7.39) age (age ¸ 55) 0.126 (5.31)
married -0.385 (3.71) years of education ( < 12) 0.042 (1.02)
grandchildren 0.565 (5.45) years of education (12 – 16) 0.092 (2.69)
age (age < 30) -0.138 (7.60) years of education ( > 16), dummy 0.468 (2.44)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.084 (4.54) number of children 9 dummies
age (age ¸ 40) -0.104 (1.46) male -0.326 (1.68)
years of education ( < 12) 0.112 (1.21) African American -0.566 (4.06)
years of education (12 – 16) 0.015 (0.49) Hispanic -0.121 (0.58)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.137 (0.81) other non–Caucasian -0.299 (0.87)
natural child 0.504 (4.38) health, fair 0.221 (0.85)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.397 (4.52) health, good -0.067 (0.28)
homeowner -0.281 (2.80) health, very good 0.152 (0.63)
school child 0.661 (4.42) health, excellent 0.083 (0.34)
constant 5.628 (4.00)





pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.216
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
“income < USD 10,000”, and “health, poor”.












21within a family. This yields a set of estimates which will di¤er numerically, but
we can impose overidentifying restrictions using a minimum distance criterion
to obtain a single estimator. Note that in our approach, the involved moment
conditions do not lead to an e¢cient estimator, unlike in the approach of Charlier
et al. (2000).
In order to form pairwise combinations of children, one needs to know which
children to compare—some order is needed (in traditional panels this is clear). In
our case, we order children according to age. The convergence of the estimator
is sensitive to the amount of censoring. We had to disregard all pairwise combi-
nations of children where more than 90% of the observations were censored (no
gifts). Also, we disregarded all combinations of children comprising less than 100
households in order to have identi…cation, and we disregard all those estimates
where the covariance matrix was singular.
Table 4.5 reports the results. Once more, we obtain results consistent with
parents having a compensatory gift behavior. If the child works more or has higher
income the gift amount will be reduced. The Wald tests of joint signi…cance have
the p–values 0:007 and 0:000.
Being a natural child, living close to the parents, and being at school increases
the gift amounts. The gift amounts are also higher for children with children
of their own. Married children get less and so do home owners. The amounts
are decreasing in age. The signs of the estimated coe¢cients remain the same
compared to Tables 4.3 and Table 4.4.
Table 4.6 reports the estimation of a random e¤ects Tobit model.16 As with the
random e¤ects probit estimator, we simulate the likelihood contributions, using
100 random draws per observation.
The Wald tests of joint signi…cance for working time and income have the
p–values 0:001 and 0:000. Maybe the most important di¤erence compared to the
conditional random e¤ects model is that the parents’ health here has a positive
impact on the amounts.
As there is no information on the total incomes of children living at home with
their parents, there are families in our sample where only some of the children are
included in the estimations. In order to check if the results are sensitive to this
we have also estimated using a subsample with families with only adult children.
Appendix B reports these estimations. The general pattern of results stay the
same using this subsample. Most importantly, gift amounts and gift probabilities
remain compensatory.
16A Hausman test of the …xed e¤ect speci…cation against the random e¤ects rejects the random
e¤ects speci…cation with a p–value of 0:001.
22Table 4.5: Gift amounts, …xed e¤ects Tobit, child level.
Child characteristics
works < 30 hours per week 0.326 (0.96)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.484 (1.93)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.841 (3.01)
income > USD 25,000 -3.262 (10.6)
married -0.017 (0.09)
grandchildren 1.280 (5.59)
age (age < 30) -0.322 (8.99)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.169 (4.23)
age (age ¸ 40) 0.164 (1.08)
years of education ( < 12) -0.660 (3.40)
years of education (12 – 16) 0.082 (1.07)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.457 (1.23)
natural child 2.908 (7.01)
lives < 10 miles from parents 1.445 (7.17)
homeowner -0.969 (4.59)
school child 0.491 (1.77)
number of children 13,454
number of families 3,992
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
The table reports …nal estimates from unbalanced Honoré
LS [MDE]. Absolute t–values in parentheses.
Children are ordered according to age.
Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
and “income < USD 10,000”.
23Table 4.6: Gift amounts, random e¤ects Tobit, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, family respondent
works < 30 hours per week -0.213 (0.44) log net worth 0.301 (8.53)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -1.134 (3.61) log income 1.668 (15.2)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.619 (1.79) age (age < 55) 0.029 (0.65)
income > USD 25,000 -2.692 (6.71) age (age ¸ 55) 0.222 (2.94)
married -1.089 (4.07) years of education ( < 12) 0.420 (3.57)
grandchildren 1.416 (5.02) years of education (12 – 16) 0.644 (5.37)
age (age < 30) -0.416 (8.13) years of education ( > 16), dummy 1.005 (1.49)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.270 (5.11) number of children 9 dummies
age (age ¸ 40) -0.669 (2.48) male -0.731 (1.26)
years of education ( < 12) 0.500 (1.87) African American -2.104 (4.91)
years of education (12 – 16) 0.002 (0.02) Hispanic -0.551 (0.91)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.384 (0.83) other non–Caucasian 0.226 (0.21)
natural child 1.823 (4.82) health, fair 1.839 (2.67)
lives < 10 miles from parents 1.326 (5.36) health, good 1.754 (2.72)
homeowner 2.072 (4.82) health, very good 2.099 (3.17)
school child 0.644 (1.38) health, excellent 2.235 (3.29)
constant -23.13 (6.00)
number of children 14,927 number of families 4,905
pseudo R2, McFadden 0.062
pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.313
log likelihood -14,290.1
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
“income < USD 10,000”, and “health, poor”.
245. Concluding remarks
Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers usually …nd that bequests are
equally divided among heirs while inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory.
Using the HRS data set, we …nd that only 4% of parents who give, divide their
gifts equally among their children.
In this paper we take the sum of gifts over time into account by adding the
gifts reported in the two available waves of HRS together. This should wash out
some of the e¤ects stemming from purely temporary gifts. To the extent that a
time span of two years is long enough, one might interpret the results given here
as supporting evidence for long–run giving behavior. Viewed this way, it is not
the case that results are driven by smoothing of temporary shocks to income.
Estimating probit models, using family panels, we …nd that gifts are compen-
satory in the sense that a child is more likely to receive a gift if she works fewer
hours and has lower income than than her brothers and sisters.
These results carry over to the amounts given. Estimations of …xed and ran-
dom e¤ects linear models, conditional on positive family gift amounts, and …xed
and random e¤ect Tobit estimations show that the fewer hours a child works and
t h el o w e rh e ri n c o m ei s ,t h em o r et h ep a r e n t sg i v e . 17
The empirical …ndings suggest that gifts are compensatory. This is consistent
with the predictions of the altruistic model of intergenerational transfers.
Still, observations for only two years are probably only rough estimations of the
long–run gift behavior. We would also have liked to combine further information
from the 1994 HRS wave with the data of the 1992 wave, in particular the data of
time-varying regressors on both children’s and parents’ characteristics. We found
it di¢cult, however, to reconcile the varying variable de…nitions over time, so that
we abstain from this for the moment. These are topics for future research.
17The qualitative results are the same if we only use gift data from the 1992 HRS wave.
25A. Appendix. Sample statistics
The weighted sample statistics for the children can be found Table A.1. The
columns to the left report sample statistics for the individuals while the columns
to the right concern the sample statistics of the means of the children in each
family.
Table A.2 report the weighted sample statistics for the parent who is the family
respondent. The exceptions are net worth and income which refer to both spouses.
26T a b l eA . 1 :S a m p l es t a t i s t i c s ,c h i l d r e n .
individuals: family means:
variable obs mean s d min max obs mean s d min max
gift received 18,883 .256 5,394 .316 .369 0 1
gift amount, USD 18,883 1219 4,728 0 114,184 5,394 1,670 5,093 0 114,184
does not work at all 17,684 .191 5,286 .185 .265 0 1
works < 30 h per week 17,684 .097 5,286 .105 .214 0 1
works ¸ 30 h per week 17,684 .712 5,286 .710 .314 0 1
income < USD 10,000 14,960 .177 4,910 .165 .285 0 1
income USD 10,000-25,000 14,960 .347 4,910 .343 .364 0 1
income > USD 25,000 14,960 .476 4,910 .492 .404 0 1
married 17,686 .544 5,286 .523 .351 0 1
grandchildren 17,686 .558 5,286 .516 .363 0 1
age 18,883 28.9 6.93 1 60 5,394 28.6 5.76 3 54.7
years of education 17,654 13.1 2.18 1 17 5,285 13.3 1.80 3.75 17
natural child 18,883 .755 5,394 .812 .369 0 1
lives < 10 m from parents 14,960 .402 4,910 .407 .383 0 1
homeowner 15,672 .450 4,996 .447 .370 0 1
schoolchild 17,686 .124 5,286 .145 .265 0 1
Table A.2: Sample statistics, parents.
family respondent:
variable n of obs mean s d min max
gift made 5,394 .538
gift amount, USD 5,394 4,157 11,102 0 251,128
net worth, USD 1,000 5,394 239 493 -745 8,735
income, USD 1,000 5,394 46.6 47.0 -8.50 600
age 5,393 53.9 5.22 28 72
years of education 5,394 12.3 2.81 0 17
number of children 5,394 3.41 1.88 1 18
male 5,394 .067
African American 5,394 .097
Hispanic 5,394 .064
other non–Caucasian 5,394 .023
health, poor 5,394 .065
health, fair 5,394 .124
health, good 5,394 .253
health, very good 5,394 .306
health, excellent 5,394 .252
27B. Appendix. Subsample: Families with adult children only
This appendix reports estimations using the same speci…cation as in Section 4
but restricting the sample to families with adult children only. This reduces the
number of observations possible to use in the estimations from 4,905 families
with 14,927 children to 2,363 families with 7,290 children. The qualitative results
remain the same in general. Most importantly gifts are compensatory also in this
restricted sample.
28Table B.1: Gift probability, marginal e¤ects, probit, family level.
Child characteristics, family averages Parent characteristics, family respondent
works < 30 hours per week -0.005 (0.07) log net worth 0.013 (4.43)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.004 (0.10) log income 0.080 (6.81)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.039 (0.76) age (age < 55) 0.003 (0.54)
income > USD 25,000 -0.061 (1.16) age (age ¸ 55) 0.005 (0.81)
married -0.019 (0.49) years of education ( < 12) 0.020 (1.87)
grandchildren 0.009 (0.24) years of education (12 – 16) 0.037 (3.95)
age (age < 30) -0.013 (1.85) years of education ( > 16), dummy 0.012 (0.22)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.007 (1.29) number of children 9 dummies
age (age ¸ 40) -0.075 (2.06) male -0.077 (1.80)
years of education ( < 12) 0.070 (1.62) African American -0.084 (2.43)
years of education (12 – 16) -0.010 (1.06) Hispanic -0.046 (0.79)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.151 (2.19) other non–Caucasian 0.140 (1.34)
natural child 0.058 (1.84) health, fair 0.157 (2.96)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.053 (1.76) health, good 0.136 (2.72)
homeowner -0.178 (4.84) health, very good 0.144 (2.87)
health, excellent 0.139 (2.65)
number of families 2,363
Â2(27) 356.8
pseudo R2, McFadden 0.111
pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.278
log likelihood -1,426.3
Notes. Absolute z–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
“income < USD 10,000” and “health, poor”.
29Table B.2: Gift probability, marginal e¤ects, random e¤ects probit, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, family respondent
works < 30 hours per week -0.015 (0.92) log net worth 0.006 (5.69)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.023 (1.90) log income 0.040 (11.6)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.011 (0.92) age (age < 55) 0.002 (0.57)
income > USD 25,000 -0.056 (4.02) age (age ¸ 55) 0.004 (1.57)
married -0.019 (2.05) years of education ( < 12) 0.014 (2.61)
grandchildren 0.036 (4.31) years of education (12 – 16) 0.019 (4.71)
age (age < 30) -0.008 (4.42) years of education ( > 16), dummy 0.024 (1.04)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.007 (3.95) number of children 9 dummies
age (age ¸ 40) -0.021 (2.19) male -0.013 (0.82)
years of education ( < 12) 0.015 (1.30) African American -0.030 (2.23)
years of education (12 – 16) -0.004 (1.29) Hispanic -0.002 (0.09)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.023 (1.43) other non–Caucasian 0.047 (0.66)
natural child 0.043 (3.90) health, fair 0.081 (2.24)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.038 (4.16) health, good 0.074 (2.44)
homeowner -0.044 (4.75) health, very good 0.080 (2.67)
health, excellent 0.080 (2.44)
number of children 7,290 number of families 2,363
pseudo R2, McFadden 0.111
pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.315
log likelihood -2,964.9
Notes. Absolute z–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not
work at all”, “income < USD 10,000”, and “health, poor”.
30Table B.3: Gift amounts, …xed e¤ects model, conditional on positive family
amounts, child level.
Child characteristics
works < 30 hours per week -0.470 (1.18)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.697 (2.74)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.352 (1.13)
income > USD 25,000 -1.391 (4.05)
married -0.424 (2.00)
grandchildren 0.808 (3.84)
age (age < 30) -0.147 (3.52)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.157 (4.30)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.291 (1.80)
years of education ( < 12) -0.048 (0.16)
years of education (12 – 16) -0.009 (0.13)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.169 (0.44)
natural child 0.962 (1.59)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.796 (4.10)
homeowner -0.679 (3.42)
constant 9.434 (2.76)
number of children 2,953




pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.103
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are
“does not work at all”, and “income < USD 10,000”.
31Table B.4: Gift amounts, random e¤ects model, conditional on positive family
amounts, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, family respondent
works < 30 hours per week -0.012 (0.04) log net worth 0.053 (2.68)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.192 (0.96) log income 0.193 (2.61)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.277 (1.18) age (age < 55) 0.023 (0.81)
income > USD 25,000 -0.892 (3.58) age (age ¸ 55) 0.124 (3.70)
married -0.297 (1.83) years of education ( < 12) 0.100 (1.26)
grandchildren 0.754 (4.58) years of education (12 – 16) 0.151 (2.92)
age (age < 30) -0.097 (3.06) years of education ( > 16), dummy 0.418 (1.38)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.134 (4.87) number of children 9 dummies
age (age ¸ 40) -0.186 (1.42) male -0.104 (0.36)
years of education ( < 12) 0.043 (0.20) African American -0.315 (1.32)
years of education (12 – 16) -0.005 (0.11) Hispanic 0.224 (0.56)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.094 (0.33) other non–Caucasian -0.563 (1.04)
natural child 0.768 (4.32) health, fair -0.255 (0.67)
lives < 10 miles from parents 0.480 (3.52) health, good -0.200 (0.55)
homeowner -0.258 (1.69) health, very good -0.061 (0.17)
constant 4.441 (1.51) health, excellent -0.121 (0.33)





pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.188
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
“income < USD 10,000”, and “health, poor”. Parents’ net worth measured in million USD.
32Table B.5: Gift amounts, …xed e¤ects Tobit, child level.
Child characteristics
works < 30 hours per week -1.798 (4.12)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -1.595 (4.51)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.782 (1.94)
income > USD 25,000 -2.205 (4.80)
married -0.934 (3.21)
grandchildren 1.743 (6.06)
age (age < 30) -0.443 (9.36)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.286 (6.07)
age (age ¸ 40) -0.425 (3.58)
years of education ( < 12) -0.147 (0.49)
years of education (12 – 16) 0.138 (1.36)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.957 (1.81)
natural child 1.220 (2.11)
lives < 10 miles from parents 1.544 (6.60)
homeowner -0.857 (3.68)
number of children 6,552
number of families 2,046
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
The table reports …nal estimates from unbalanced Honoré
LS [MDE]. Absolute t–values in parentheses.
Children are ordered according to age.
Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
and “income < USD 10,000”.
33Table B.6: Gift amounts, random e¤ects Tobit, child level.
Child characteristics Parent characteristics, family respondent
works < 30 hours per week -0.811 (1.04) log net worth 0.265 (5.20)
works ¸ 30 hours per week -0.931 (1.99) log income 1.801 (8.44)
income USD 10,000 – 25,000 -0.471 (0.87) age (age < 55) 0.104 (1.11)
income > USD 25,000 -2.333 (3.78) age (age ¸ 55) 0.152 (1.40)
married -0.835 (2.17) years of education ( < 12) 0.633 (2.63)
grandchildren 1.586 (3.88) years of education (12 – 16) 0.806 (4.28)
age (age < 30) -0.344 (4.29) years of education ( > 16), dummy 0.725 (0.71)
age (age 30 – 39) -0.298 (3.95) number of children 9 dummies
age (age ¸ 40) -0.954 (2.36) male -0.706 (0.90)
years of education ( < 12) 0.682 (1.38) African American -1.659 (2.32)
years of education (12 – 16) -0.158 (1.30) Hispanic -0.056 (0.05)
years of education ( > 16), dummy -0.782 (1.16) other non–Caucasian 1.356 (0.58)
natural child 2.071 (3.60) health, fair 2.976 (2.73)
lives < 10 miles from parents 1.600 (4.27) health, good 2.981 (2.95)
homeowner 1.861 (4.63) health, very good 3.151 (3.12)
constant -35.97 (8.05) health, excellent 3.117 (3.02)
number of children 7,290 number of families 2,363
pseudo R2, McFadden 0.052
pseudo R2, McKelvey & Zavoina 0.299
log likelihood -7,171.3
Notes. The dependent variable is log (amount in USD + 1).
Absolute t–values in parentheses. Reference categories are “does not work at all”,
“income < USD 10,000”, and “health, poor”.
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